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Temporal information and children’s and adults’
causal inferences
Patrick Burns and Teresa McCormack
Queen’s University Belfast, UK
Three experiments examined whether children and adults would use temporal
information as a cue to the causal structure of a three-variable system, and also
whether their judgements about the eﬀects of interventions on the system would
be aﬀected by the temporal properties of the event sequence. Participants were
shown a system in which two events B and C occurred either simultaneously
(synchronous condition) or in a temporal sequence (sequential condition)
following an initial event A. The causal judgements of adults and 6–7-year-olds
diﬀered between the conditions, but this was not the case for 4-year-
olds’ judgements. However, unlike those of adults, 6–7-year-olds’ intervention
judgements were not aﬀected by condition, and causal and intervention
judgements were not reliably consistent in this age group. The ﬁndings support
the claim that temporal information provides an important cue to causal
structure, at least in older children. However, they raise important issues about
the relationship between causal and intervention judgements.
Keywords: Causal reasoning; Interventions; Time.
Given the central role played by causal cognition in how we deal with the
everyday world, it has long been considered important to describe and
explain how children learn and reason about causal relationships (see e.g.,
Piaget, 1969; Shultz, 1982; Sperber, Premack, & Premack, 1995). A new
wave of theorising, the causal Bayes nets approach (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004;
Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik,
2004), has brought this issue to the fore, leading to a reconsideration of the
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principles underlying children’s causal inferences. This account captures
causal learning in terms of the construction of models of the structure of the
causal relationships between variables. Thus, one of the things that is
distinctive about this approach is that it has made clear the necessity of
exploring how children reason about the causal structure of the relation-
ships between novel variables. For instance, when faced with a three-
variable system ABC, how do young children learn that the causal structure
is that of, for example, a common cause (A independently causes both B and
C), causal chain (A causes B which causes C), or common eﬀect model (both
A and B independently cause C)?
In Gopnik et al.’s (2004) account, models of causal structure are assumed
to represent patterns of conditional probabilities between variables, and
research in this tradition has suggested that children are appropriately
sensitive to such patterns (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2001; Sobel et al., 2004). The
aim of the current study is not to examine such sensitivity; this has been
explored in detail elsewhere (see Special Section of Developmental Science,
2007). Rather, we focus on the role of a speciﬁc type of information that has
featured prominently in research on adults’ learning of causal structure—
temporal information. The ways in which adults’ judgements of causation
are informed or aﬀected by temporal information have recently attracted
much attention in the research literature (e.g., Buehner & May, 2002, 2003;
Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2002; Lagnado &
Sloman, 2004, 2006; Waldmann, 2001; White, 2006), with research ﬁndings
providing interesting challenges for existing accounts of causal learning
(Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). Indeed, in their review
of this literature Lagnado et al. (2007) have argued that temporal
information provides ‘‘a fundamental cue to causal structure’’ (p. 159),
even to the extent that it can override other types of cues (Lagnado &
Sloman, 2006). Despite this, little recent developmental research has
addressed this issue, although the role of temporal information has featured
prominently in earlier research on children’s causal learning. Thus the
primary aim of the current study is to examine whether children, like adults,
will use temporal information as a cue to causal structure.
The second aim of the study is to examine the relationship between
children’s judgements regarding the causal structure of a system and their
predictions about the eﬀects of interventions on the system. Descriptions of
causal learning in terms of the construction of models of a system’s structure
have led to a consideration of the relationship between causal judgements
and judgements about what would happen if a variable in the system were
intervened on. Indeed, it has been argued that even young children can use
their causal representations ﬂexibly to generate appropriate and novel
interventions on a system (Gopnik et al., 2001; Schulz, Kushnir, & Gopnik,
2007b; Sobel et al., 2004). The empirical issue that we are interested in is
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whether children’s causal models of a system support not just judgements
about how variables are causally related, but judgements about the eﬀects of
intervening on variables in the system (Hagmayer, Sloman, Lagnado, &
Waldmann, 2007). For example, if children judge that the system they have
observed is a causal chain ABC, will they also judge that C will not operate
if B is disabled? Thus, in our studies children were asked to make not just
judgements about causal structure but also judgements about the
hypothetical eﬀects of interventions on variables in the system.
EXTRACTING CAUSAL STRUCTURE
There have been a large number of studies that have addressed the role of
temporal information in children’s causal judgements (e.g., Bullock &
Gelman, 1979; Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Schlottmann, 1999; Shultz &
Mendelson, 1975; Siegler & Liebert, 1974; Sophian & Huber, 1984).
Although the ﬁndings provide a somewhat mixed picture of developmental
patterns, safe conclusions that can be drawn from the literature are that by
at least 4 to 5 years, if not earlier, children’s judgements reliably obey the
temporal priority principle (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon 1982), and that
even very young children’s causal judgements are often strongly aﬀected by
temporal contiguity (see Schlottmann, 1999). Rather than simply examining
the eﬀects of temporal continuity or whether judgements respect the
temporal priority principle, the current studies will focus on whether causal
structure judgements are systematically inﬂuenced by the temporal order in
which events have occurred. Studies with children beyond the infancy period
have typically used paradigms in which there is a clearly identiﬁed eﬀect
(e.g., a jack-in-a-box jumping up). In contrast to studies of structure
learning in adults, children have merely had to decide whether, for example,
event A or event B caused this eﬀect, rather than having to make more
sophisticated judgements about the nature of the causal structure of a
system. In Lagnado and Sloman’s (2004, 2006) studies, the adults’ task is
usually to decide on the most appropriate causal model of the relationship
between three or four variables, with there being a number of alternative
models (e.g., common cause, casual chain, or common eﬀect models) to
choose from.
Some initial studies have been conducted to examine if young children
can also learn to discriminate between diﬀerent causal structures (see
Gopnik et al., 2004). Most notably, Schulz, Gopnik, and Glymour (2007a)
explored whether young children can use information about the eﬀects of
interventions on variables in a system to extract causal structure. The role of
intervention information has been viewed as particularly important in recent
accounts of causal learning, because information about the eﬀects of
intervening on (i.e., selectively ﬁxing the value of) a variable can
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discriminate between causal structures that are diﬃcult to tell apart through
observation of covariation alone (Hagmayer et al., 2007; Lagnado &
Sloman, 2004; Schulz et al., 2007b; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, &
Blum, 2003). To use a familiar example from the literature, it is diﬃcult
using observation alone to discriminate between a causal chain in which A
causes C and C causes B and a situation in which C is a common cause of B
and A, since covariation information is identical in both cases (see Lagnado
& Sloman, 2004; Schulz et al., 2007b). However, if the value of C is
selectively intervened on, it should be possible to easily discriminate these
structures. For example, making C happen will increase the likelihood of
observing B but not A if the structure is the causal chain, but will increase
the likelihood of both A and B if the structure is the common cause one (see
Sloman & Lagnado, 2005).
In Schulz et al.’s (2007a) study, a range of interventions on a novel three-
variable system (a set of gears), was demonstrated to 4-year-old children,
after which they were presented with diﬀerent anthropomorphised diagrams
depicting causal structure. Children appeared to be able to use intervention
information to select the appropriate causal structure. Thus, Schulz et al.’s
(2007a) study provides some preliminary evidence that young children may
be able to extract causal structure when provided with one type of
information: intervention information. However, their study was not
designed to address the additional issue of whether temporal information
may assist children in determining causal structure in a manner similar to
that found in adults. Lagnado and Sloman (2004, 2006) have argued that in
many scenarios the usefulness of intervention information may be to a large
extent (though not fully) explained by the fact that interventions normally
provide us with temporal order information. They point out that making an
intervention is often accompanied by temporal order information: If you
intervene to make B happen, and then C happens, not only are you provided
with information about consequences of your intervention but you are
confronted with a demonstration in which B has occurred temporally prior
to C. That is, temporal cues are usually ‘‘built into the nature of an
intervention’’ (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, p. 869).
Lagnado and Sloman (2006) argued that studies on the eﬀects of
interventions need to disentangle the provision of information about the
consequences of interventions with the provision of temporal order
information. In their own study they achieved this by pitting temporal
order information against intervention information. By this means Lagnado
and Sloman have demonstrated that participants preferentially use
information about the temporal order in which events have happened in
order to decide on a causal structure, even when they have been made aware
that such information may be misleading and even when it runs contrary to
conditional probability information provided by carrying out interventions.
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On the basis of these ﬁndings, they have suggested that adults frequently use
a simple temporal cue heuristic along the lines of ‘‘if you perceive or produce
an event, infer that any subsequent correlated changes are eﬀects of that
cause’’ (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, p. 896). Applying this heuristic iteratively
to each pair of events that one observes will aﬀect causal structure
judgements. So, for example, if a participant views an event sequence in
which event A happens and then event B occurs, followed subsequently by
event C, use of this heuristic will lead them to conclude that event A caused
event B which then caused event C—a causal chain structure. In Lagnado
and Sloman’s studies, participants appeared to rely heavily on temporal
order information in this way.
THE CURRENT STUDY
The conclusion that can be drawn from Lagnado and Sloman’s (2004, 2006)
studies is that temporal information may provide an important class of
information about causal structure in and of itself, and as such is one that
needs investigation in children. Our study addressed this issue. Lagnado and
Sloman’s experiments have already clearly demonstrated that adults are
likely to infer a causal chain structure when they observe event A followed
by event B followed by event C. Furthermore, their ﬁndings suggest that if
participants were to view a sequence in which event A happens and then
events B and C happen simultaneously, they would be likely to judge that A
is a common cause of B and C. Our study examined whether children’s
judgements about causal structure are similarly aﬀected by the timing of
events. Our task diﬀers from those of Lagnado and Sloman in that the use of
temporal information was not pitted against intervention information
(doing so involves introducing quite complex scenarios where the temporal
order in which participants ﬁnd out about the consequences of interventions
diﬀers from the order in which events actually unfold). Rather, the primary
aim of the study was simply to explore whether children will exploit
temporal information in a scenario in which they have been provided with
minimal information on which to infer causal structure.
It is not known whether under such circumstances children’s causal
judgements, which are derived from information other than that from
performed or observed interventions, are commensurate with judgements
about what would happen in hypothetical circumstances given certain
interventions. In one of Schulz et al.’s studies (2007a, Exp. 2), preschool
children were better than chance in making predictions about the eﬀects of
interventions on a causal system. So, for example, if the relationship
between three variables A, B, and C was a causal chain, children were more
likely than chance to predict that if B is intervened upon such that it can no
longer operate, then C will no longer occur following the occurrence of A.
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However, in that study children were actually explicitly told what the causal
structure of the relationships was, rather than having to derive it them-
selves, whereas in our study children had to initially infer causal structure.
Thus, the secondary aim of the study was to explore whether temporal
information has a similar eﬀect on judgements regarding interventions
as on causal judgements, and whether there is indeed consistency
between causal judgements and judgements about the consequences of
interventions.
This issue is important because it has recently been argued that not only
may intervention information play a useful role in deriving causal structure,
but that the way causal relationships are represented should allow
participants who have learned a causal structure to straightforwardly
predict the eﬀects of interventions on variables in the causal system
(Hagmayer et al., 2007; Schulz et al., 2007b). In particular, researchers who
describe causal representation in terms of models of causal structure have
argued that such representations can be used to make simple inferences
about the eﬀects of real or hypothetical interventions (Hagmayer et al.,
2007; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). If these
suggestions are correct, then we might expect to see that judgements about
the eﬀects of interventions on a variable in a system are consist with causal
judgements about the relationships between the variables and are aﬀected in
the same way by temporal cues.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment we devised a very simple scenario in which temporal
information may provide a cue to causal structure. The scenario was as
follows: an initial event A was subsequently followed by two events, B and C.
The three events covaried with 100% reliability, such that each time A
occurred, B and C followed. From the covariation information alone one
may conclude that the three events are causally related, but no further
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of these relationships. It was
hypothesised, however, that the presence of temporal information may
inform judgements of how the three events are causally connected, i.e., the
underlying causal structure of the system. Speciﬁcally, it was predicted that
when events B and C occur simultaneously after event A, a common cause
structure will be inferred, whereas when events A, B, and C form a temporal
sequence, a causal chain structure will be inferred (see Figure 1). Three age
groups were tested: 4-year-olds, 6–7-year-olds, and adults. Based on previous
research on children’s use of temporal information in causal judgements, we
predicted that the 6–7-year-olds were likely to use such information in a
manner similar to that of adults. Findings from some existing studies might
suggest that 4-year-olds are also likely to exploit such information.
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Method
Participants. Three age groups of participants took part in the study: 50
4-year-olds (M¼ 55 months, Range¼ 48–63 months), 58 6–7-year-olds
(M¼ 84 months, Range¼ 76–90 months), and 60 adults (M¼ 25 years,
Range¼ 18–59 years). There were 95 females and 73 males in total. Children
were recruited from a number of schools and preschools, and testing took
place individually in their schools. Adult participants were approached on
the university campus and asked whether they would volunteer to take part
in a short experiment. They were not paid for their participation.
Apparatus. A box was designed and constructed for the purposes of this
experiment. The box was rectangular and measured 33 cm6 45 cm6
15 cm. The box housed three devices on its surface, the action of which
constituted events A, B, and C. Device A was a red toggle that could be
manually moved back and forth. The second device was a blue square plate,
which rotated around a central axis at a frequency of 120 Hz. The third
device was a black and white plunger that moved up and down on the
vertical plane at a frequency of 60 Hz. The devices were approximately
equal in size (the plunger and toggle were 5 cm in height while the plate was
5 cm across) and in their resting state they were clearly visible. The devices
were positioned on the surface of the box to form an equilateral triangle.
Event A (the movement of the toggle) was always manually instigated by the
experimenter. The action of the other two devices was driven by hidden
motors and their timing controlled by a laptop computer placed inside the
box. This allowed for maximal control over the temporal characteristics of
the experimental sequences.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions: either the synchronous or the sequential condition. Figure 2
illustrates the temporal characteristics of a single demonstration trial in both
conditions. The sequence of events in both conditions was initiated by the
Figure 1. The two temporal conditions.
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experimenter pushing the toggle forward (event A). The timing of each
demonstration began the moment the toggle was pushed. Aside from these
diﬀerences in the timing of events, the procedure was identical across the
two conditions.
At the start of the experiment participants were invited to have a look at
the ‘‘special box’’ of the experimenter. All participants were seated facing
the box adjacent to the positions of the plunger and plate (used in events B
and C), while the experimenter sat on the opposite side of the box, behind
the toggle (used in event A). In the initial orientation to the box, children
were asked ﬁrst to point out the three devices and then to identify the colour
of each of them; the responses they provided were used by the experimenter
as referents for the three devices throughout the rest of the experiment.
Children who were unable to discriminate between the three devices on the
basis of their colour were not included in the subsequent analysis. When
testing adults the devices were labelled by the experimenter as the toggle,
plate, and plunger. Children were then instructed as follows: ‘‘Now then, I
want you to watch what happens when I move the red one [experimenter
points to the toggle]. OK?’’ The experimenter then pushed the toggle
forward to initiate the ﬁrst demonstration. After the ﬁrst demonstration the
experimenter said to the child, ‘‘Did you see that? Let me show you again.’’
Three further demonstration sequences followed. Children were then asked
two direct, forced-choice causal questions about events B and C: ‘‘Can you
tell me, which one of the other two makes the blue one [plate] go?’’ and
‘‘Which one of the other two makes the white one [plunger] go?’’ Adult
participants were asked to observe the box while the experimenter pushed
the toggle. They also observed the experimenter initiate four demonstrations
after which they were asked the same two forced-choice causal questions
about events B and C (with the adult referents for the devices used).
Figure 2. The temporal characteristics of each condition.
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After answering the causal questions, children then observed two further
demonstrations as a reminder of the event sequence, after which they were
asked two intervention questions. After the demonstrations had ﬁnished, the
experimenter intervened on the device used in either event B or C, manually
holding it and thus preventing it from moving. It was then stressed to
participants that the intervention completely disabled the action of the
device. The experimenter said, ‘‘I am going to stop this one from going
[intervention was then performed]. So now this one cannot go at all. It really
cannot go.’’ All participants were then asked a hypothetical question about
what would now happen should event A occur. For example, when the
plunger was disabled participants were asked, ‘‘If I push the blue one
[toggle], will the red one [plate] still go?’’ After participants had given their
answer the experimenter then disabled the other device (B or C) and asked a
similar hypothetical question about the eﬀect of this second intervention.
Which speciﬁc device featured in event B and which in event C was
counterbalanced across participants; likewise the order in which participants
were asked about events B and C was counterbalanced for both the causal
and intervention questions. However, the causal questions were always
asked prior to the intervention questions.
Results
A small number of children in the 4-year-old group (N¼ 4) were unable to
name the colours of the three devices and were thus excluded from the
experiment. Initial analyses revealed that the spatial locations of events B
and C had no eﬀect on responses to either the causal or intervention
questions.
Causal questions. Responses to causal questions were categorised as
follows. Responding that A caused both B and C was always coded as a
common cause response, and responding that A caused B and B caused C
was always coded as a causal chain response. Responding that A caused C
and C caused B was coded as a causal chain response in the synchronous
condition, but in the sequential condition this causal chain was inconsistent
with the temporal order in which the events occurred because B had
occurred before C. Thus, this type of response was coded as a time-
inconsistent response in the sequential condition. (This response was not
judged to be time-inconsistent in the synchronous condition because it
remains possible that C could have caused B even though the two were
perceived as occurring simultaneously, see e.g., the events used in Schulz
et al.’s, 2007a, study.) Finally, judging that B caused C and C caused B was
coded as a coupled response in the synchronous condition; in the sequential
condition this response was again inconsistent with the temporal order of
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events because C had occurred after B. Thus, this response was also coded
as a time-inconsistent response in this condition.
Table 1 shows the percentage of participants in each condition whose
responses were in each category. Responses categorised as coupled or time-
inconsistent responses were infrequent among each of the age groups, with
just eight of the 4-year-olds, two of the 6–7-year-olds, and none of the adults
giving such responses. Chi-squared analyses examined whether the
distribution of common cause and causal chain responses diﬀered across
the two conditions. (Note that responses categorised as coupled or time-
inconsistent were excluded from these analyses because they were relatively
infrequent and our predictions concerned the distribution of common cause
and causal chain responses across conditions; omitting these responses from
the analyses has the consequence that the N reported for each chi-squared
analysis does not always match the total number of children tested in each
age group.) The 4-year-old group showed no diﬀerence between the two
conditions in the distribution of common cause and causal chain responses,
w2(1, N¼ 38)¼ 0.11, p¼ .74. However, it is important to note that although
the distribution of the 4-year-olds’ responses across conditions was not in
line with a temporal cue hypothesis, this group did not entirely ignore
temporal information. Crucially, very few children gave responses that
suggested a belief in backward causation: only two children in the sequential
condition judged that C was the cause of B, and in this condition a binomial
test showed that the number of children who judged that A was the cause of
B was signiﬁcantly higher than the number who judged that C was the cause
of B, N¼ 23, p5 .001.
Turning to the older groups of participants, there was an eﬀect of
condition on the responses of 677-year-old group, w2(1, N¼ 56)¼ 7.08,
p¼ .008; in this group the majority of participants were categorised as giving
the common cause response in the synchronous condition and the
appropriate causal chain response in the sequential condition. Likewise
TABLE 1
Percentage of participants giving each response type to causal questions as a function
of condition in Experiment 1
4-year-olds 6–7-year-olds Adults
Synchronous Sequential Synchronous Sequential Synchronous Sequential
Common cause 39% 43% 62% 28% 80% 53%
Causal chain 35% 48% 31% 72% 20% 47%
Coupled 26% – 7% – 0% –
Time-inconsistent – 9% – 0% – 0%
– indicates that the response type does not apply in that condition.
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the adult group also showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition, w2(1,
N¼ 60)¼ 4.80, p¼ .03; again, most adults in the synchronous condition
were categorised as giving the common cause response. In the sequential
condition the adult pattern was somewhat diﬀerent from that of 6–7-year-
olds, and from that which we had predicted, in that responses were almost
evenly divided between common cause and causal chain categories. Note,
however, that a participant who believes the structure to be a causal chain in
this condition (i.e., believes that A causes B and B causes C) is nevertheless
justiﬁed in judging that A made both B and C happen, since the initial event
A is represented as setting the chain in motion. Thus, some of the responses
categorised as synchronous in this condition may nevertheless have been
made by adults who extracted a causal chain structure (as the analyses of
intervention responses below suggests).
Further analyses examined whether there were age diﬀerences in the
extent to which participants’ responses were aﬀected by temporal cues in the
predicted direction. For each age group we calculated the total numbers of
responses across conditions predicted by a temporal cue hypothesis and the
total number of responses unpredicted by such a hypothesis (collapsed
across all other response categories), with common cause responses
categorised as the predicted response in the synchronous condition and
causal chain responses categorised as the predicted response in the
sequential condition. The numbers of participants whose responses fell into
the predicted categories varied signiﬁcantly with age, w2(2, N¼ 164)¼ 6.68,
p5 .05, with the 6–7-year-olds producing signiﬁcantly more responses in the
predicted categories than 4-year-olds, w2(1, N¼ 104)¼ 5.90, p5 .02, but not
signiﬁcantly more than adults, w2(1, N¼ 118)¼ 0.20, p4 .05. Thus there was
an age eﬀect in the extent to which temporal cues aﬀected responding, in
that older children and adults were signiﬁcantly more likely to produce
responses in line with a temporal cue hypothesis.
Intervention questions. As with the causal questions, the responses to the
intervention questions were placed into categories that were analogous to
the categories that responses to the causal questions were placed in (see
Table 2). Answering yes to both questions (i.e., B will still go if C is
prevented from operating and C will still go if B is prevented from
operating) was categorised as a common cause response. Judging that B will
still go if C is prevented from operating but that C will not go if B is
prevented from operating was always categorised as a causal chain response.
Judging that C will still go if B is prevented from operating but that B will
not go if C is prevented from operating was also categorised as causal chain
response in the synchronous condition but was classed as a time-inconsistent
response in the sequential condition. Finally judging that neither C nor B
will go if the other device is prevented from operating was classed as a
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coupled response in the synchronous condition but a time-inconsistent
response in the sequential condition.
Table 3 shows the percentage of participants in each condition who gave
each response type combination. The majority of 4-year-olds in both
conditions gave common cause type responses, and there was no diﬀerence
in how responses were categorised across conditions. The 6–7-year-old
group showed a mixed pattern of responding that also did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly between the conditions w2(1, N¼ 45)¼ 1.14, p¼ .29. Relatively
few adults gave coupled responses in the adult group (six in total across both
conditions); the majority of adults’ responses were categorised as common
cause in the synchronous condition and causal chain in the sequential
condition. Chi-squared analyses showed that the distribution of common
cause and causal chain responses in the adult group diﬀered between
conditions w2(1, N¼ 54)¼ 10.61, p¼ .001. Of note is the fact that of the 16
adults in the sequential condition who had been categorised as giving
common cause responses to the causal questions, the majority (10/16) gave
responses to the intervention questions that were categorised as causal chain
TABLE 2
Response categories for intervention questions
A A
I*— C? B? —I*
Common cause Yes Yes
Causal chain No Yes
Synchronous condition: Causal chain Yes No
Sequential condition: Time-inconsistent Yes No
Synchronous condition: Coupled No No
Sequential condition: Time-inconsistent No No
*Denotes an intervention on a variable that prevents it from operating.
TABLE 3
Percentage of participants giving each response type to intervention questions as a
function of condition in Experiment 1
4-year-olds 6–7-year-olds Adults
Synchronous Sequential Synchronous Sequential Synchronous Sequential
Common cause 61% 70% 48% 41% 60% 27%
Causal chain 13% 4% 28% 38% 23% 70%
Coupled 26% – 24% – 17% –
Time-inconsistent – 26% – 21% – 3%
– indicates that the response type does not apply in that condition.
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responses. This suggests that in this condition most of those adult
participants who judged that A caused both B and C when asked the
causal questions nevertheless believed that the structure was that of a causal
chain.
As with the analyses of responses to causal questions, further analyses
examined whether there were age eﬀects in the extent to which participants’
responses to intervention questions were aﬀected by temporal cues in the
predicted direction. Responses to intervention questions were scored as
predicted or unpredicted by a temporal cue hypothesis in the same manner
as responses to causal questions (see above). The numbers of responses that
fell into the categories predicted by a temporal cue hypothesis varied
signiﬁcantly with age, w2(2, N¼ 164)¼ 11.87, p5 .01. The 6–7-year-olds did
not produce signiﬁcantly more responses in the predicted categories than 4-
year-olds, w2(1, N¼ 104)¼ 1.19, p4 .05, but did produce signiﬁcantly fewer
responses in the predicted categories than adults, w2(1, N¼ 118)¼ 5.70,
p5 .02. Thus, there was an age eﬀect in the extent to which temporal cues
aﬀected responses to intervention questions, with adults’ responses to these
questions being more likely to be as predicted by a temporal cue hypothesis
than those of children.
Last, additional analyses examined the consistency of responses to causal
questions and intervention questions in the two groups that showed an eﬀect
of temporal condition on answers to the causal questions. If it is allowed
that judging A to have caused both B and C in the sequential condition is
consistent with giving a causal chain response to intervention questions in
this condition, 83% of adults gave consistent responses across both question
types, but only 59% of the 6–7-year-olds showed such consistency. Chi-
squared analysis showed that there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
groups in the number of participants who were consistent in their answers to
the two question types, w2(1, N¼ 118)¼ 8.78, p¼ .003.
Discussion
The responses of both the adults and the 6–7-year-olds to the causal
questions support our initial hypothesis that temporal order information
inﬂuences causal structure judgements. For both of these age groups there
were diﬀerences in the pattern of responses to the causal questions across the
two conditions in the predicted directions. The ﬁnding that timing inﬂuences
causal structure judgements in these groups corroborates the ﬁndings of
Lagnado and Sloman (2004, 2006). By contrast, the responses to the causal
questions of the 4-year-olds did not diﬀer across the two conditions.
Moreover, for the intervention questions, the majority of 4-year-olds were
categorised as giving a common cause response regardless of the temporal
condition to which they were assigned. This may well reﬂect a yes bias in
TIME AND CAUSATION 179
response to the intervention questions, as common cause responses were
deﬁned as those in which yes responses were given to both intervention
questions. The 6–7-year-old age group also did not reveal any diﬀerence in
their response to the intervention questions across the two conditions
despite having responded diﬀerently to the causal questions across the two
conditions. In this group, however, responses categorised as common cause
did not dominate the answers.
Interestingly, then, the three age groups each show a diﬀerent overall
pattern of response across the two question types. Four-year-olds showed no
diﬀerential sensitivity to the temporal properties of events across the
conditions in responses to either the causal or intervention questions. Adults,
by contrast, showed a sensitivity to the temporal information manipulation
in responses to both causal and intervention questions. Finally, while 6–7-
year-olds’ responses to the causal questions did diﬀer between the two
conditions, their responses to the intervention questions were not aﬀected by
the temporal properties of the demonstrations they had observed. Both
adults and 6–7-year-olds were signiﬁcantly less likely to give common cause
responses in the sequential condition than in the synchronous condition,
although in the sequential condition, the 6–7-year-olds gave more causal
chain responses than the adults. However, the majority of adults in the
sequential condition who gave common cause responses to the causal
questions went on to give causal chain responses to the intervention
questions. It may be the case that adults are more likely to give the cautious
response that A is the cause of both B and C in the sequential condition, as
this is correct regardless of the actual underlying causal structure.
Given that adults’ responses to the intervention questions were typically
commensurate with their responses to the causal questions in the way one
would expect, it is somewhat surprising that 6–7-year-olds responses to the
causal and intervention questions were not reliably consistent. This might
suggest that when children have to make causal structure judgements
without observing relevant intervention information (in this case, based
purely on temporal information), they base their judgements on representa-
tions that do not support subsequent judgements regarding the eﬀects of
interventions.
EXPERIMENT 2
In our second experiment we re-examined the consistency of causal and
intervention judgements in this age group but we changed the order in which
children were asked each type of question. There were two reasons for this
manipulation of question order. First, it may be the case that getting
children to consider the hypothetical consequences of interventions leads
them to generate representations of causal structure that support both
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judgements about interventions and causal judgements. Second, and more
prosaically, asking the questions in this order would also control for any
explanation of children’s performance on the intervention questions in terms
of fatigue of having already answered two causal questions.
Method
Participants. A total of 60 6–7-year-old children (M¼ 86 months,
Range¼ 78–92 months, 32 females and 28 males) took part in the study.
They were recruited from local schools.
Procedure. The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 1.
After an initial introduction to the box, participants in both conditions
passively observed four demonstration trials initiated by the experimenter.
They were then asked the same two intervention questions as in Experiment
1 (question order counterbalanced). Children then observed two further
demonstration trials as a reminder of the event sequence. Participants were
then asked the same two causal questions as in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Responses to causal questions are shown in Table 4; the pattern for each
condition closely resembles that found in Experiment 1. A chi-squared
analysis examined whether the distribution of the number of answers
categorised as causal chain and common cause responses diﬀered across the
two conditions. As in Experiment 1, relatively few children produced
coupled or time-inconsistent responses and these responses were excluded
from this analysis. The distribution of the number of answers categorised as
causal chain and common cause responses diﬀered signiﬁcantly across the
two conditions w2(1, N¼ 55)¼ 7.9, p5 .01, Responses to intervention
questions were categorised in the same way as in Experiment 1. As in the
previous experiment, the distribution of common cause and causal chain
responses did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two conditions, w2(1,
N¼ 37)¼ 0.001, p¼ .97. However, we note that in both conditions there
were more responses categorised as coupled/time-inconsistent than in
Experiment 1. Consistency of responses across causal and intervention
questions was examined in the same manner as in Experiment 1; only 42%
of children were consistent in their responses across the two question types.
Thus, the key ﬁndings of this experiment replicate those of Experiment 1,
in that temporal information appears to inform causal judgements but not
judgements regarding interventions in a 6–7-year-old group. The only
diﬀerence of note in the response patterns found in this experiment and
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those found in Experiment 1 is that in Experiment 2 there were a larger
number of children who responded ‘‘no’’ to both intervention questions.
The majority of time-inconsistent responses in the sequential condition were
of this form and by deﬁnition all of the coupled responses in the
synchronous condition. It may be that children are more conservative in
their responses to intervention questions if they have not yet been asked to
make explicit causal judgements.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiments 1 and 2, in the 6–7-year-old group diﬀerent patterns of
performance were found on causal questions than on intervention questions.
One possible explanation of this disparity is that although children of this
age made judgements about the causal relationships between pairs of events
in the predicted manner, in fact such judgements were made without
extracting an overall causal structure that linked together the three events
they had observed. In other words, children may have extracted something
about the causal relationships between individual pairs of events but not
reliably formed an integrated model of the relationships between all three
events. For example, they may have judged that A caused B, and that B
caused C, but not realised that the implication of this is that there is also a
particular sort of causal relationship between A and C, namely a causal
chain that runs from A to C through B. By contrast, it may be the case that
adults found it easier to consolidate their judgements about connections
between individual pairs of events into such an integrated model of overall
causal structure. It is possible that only participants who possessed such an
integrated representation were able to make intervention judgements about
the system in a manner that was consistent with causal judgements. Indeed,
the intervention questions themselves were cast in terms of the relationships
Table 4
Percentage of children giving each response type as a function of condition in
Experiment 2
Synchronous Sequential
Causal Questions Common cause 57% 27%
Causal chain 30% 70%
Coupled 13% –
Time-inconsistent – 3%
Intervention Questions Common cause 43% 33%
Causal chain 27% 20%
Coupled 30% –
Time-inconsistent – 47%
– indicates that the response type does not apply in that condition.
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between all three events: Eﬀectively, participants were asked to judge what
would happen to C if A were to happen given that B could not happen.
In Experiments 1 and 2 we questioned children about which component
had made another component operate, and inferred the causal structure they
had extracted from answers to these questions. This mode of questioning
(i.e., asking about the causal relationship between individual pairs of events)
is similar to that used in some other studies of adult causal structure learning
(e.g., Sobel & Kushnir, 2006). However, some studies with adults have used
graphical representations of the relationships between variables, typically
involving arrows depicting causal links (see Hagmayer et al., 2007). Previous
research has indicated that even 4–5-year-old children are also able to
understand simple causal diagrams that represent causal structure (Schulz
et al., 2007a). Unlike direct causal questions about individual causal relations
(such as those asked in Experiments 1 and 2), diagrams of causal models are
potentially diagnostic of the presence of an overall integrated causal
structure representation. The diagrams used in Schulz et al.’s (2007a) study
diﬀered from those used with adults primarily in the way causal relationships
were depicted (components were anthropomorphised, with hands rather
than arrows). In our third experiment we introduced similar simple pictures,
which visually represented three diﬀerent possible causal structures and
asked both children and adults to select between them.
This design allowed us to distinguish between two possible descriptions of
children’s performance. First, it may be that children can report on causal
relationships between pairs of variables, but have no integrated model of
these relationships, and thus cannot make appropriate intervention
judgements. If this is the case, we might expect children’s choice of causal
model to be inconsistent with answers to the causal questions. Alternatively,
it may be that children of this age do in fact construct an integrated
representation of the relationships between all three variables but they
cannot use this to make intervention judgements, in which case their
answers to causal questions would be consistent with their choice of causal
model but still inconsistent with their answers to intervention questions. We
predicted that an adult group’s selection of causal model would be
consistent with the responses they gave to the causal questions.
Method
Participants. A total of 60 6–7-year-old children (M¼ 83 months,
Range¼ 77–90 months, 26 females and 32 males) recruited from local
schools took part in the study. In addition, 52 adults completed the task
(M¼ 30 years, Range¼ 20–60 years)
Materials. A new box was constructed for use in this study that was
slightly larger than the previous box (35 cm6 49 cm6 17 cm). Three new
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devices made up the three events: a blue ball set at an angle on a bent spindle
that rotated in the horizontal plane on an elliptical path; a yellow square
that rotated around its centre point in the horizontal plane; and a red
bar that also rotated around its centre point in the horizontal plane. The
three devices were interchangeable in each of the three ports associated with
events A, B, and C, and which device was used in which port was varied
between participants. The horizontal rotation of the components meant that
the apparatus was more similar to that used in Schulz et al.’s (2007a) study,
although the apparatus diﬀered from theirs in that none of the components
actually touched each other.
Three diagrams were used in the test phase. Schulz et al. (2007a) found
that this was the maximum number that could be used with young children,
and furthermore in Experiments 1 and 2 the overwhelming majority of
children gave responses that were categorised as either common cause or
causal chain responses to the causal questions, with relatively few
categorised as coupled. The pictures consisted of a colour digital
photograph of the box from above, with an image of a reaching extended
hand representing the connections between the events (see Figure 3 for an
example). In the common cause picture two hands emerged from the A
component, with one directed at the B component and one directed at the C
component. There were also two causal chain pictures. In the ABC picture a
hand emerging from the A component reached towards the B component
and a hand emerging from the B component reached towards the C
Figure 3. Sample diagram used in Experiment 3, showing a causal chain: the pictures of hands
are overlaid on a photograph of the apparatus. The photographs presented to participants were
in colour.
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component; in the ACB picture a hand emerging from the A component
reached towards the C component and a hand emerging from the C
component reached towards the B component (in fact, which speciﬁc
component featured in B and C events was counterbalanced across
participants).
Procedure. The initial procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 up
until the point at which the experimenter asked the causal questions. After
these questions had been asked, the three pictures of the causal structures
were then introduced. They were placed before participants in front of the
box in a random order. Each picture was explained in the same manner.
Both children and adults were told, for example, that ‘‘This hand shows that
the [blue] one makes the [red] one go’’ and ‘‘This hand shows that the [blue]
one makes the [yellow] one go.’’ After each of the three pictures had been
explained, all participants observed a further two demonstrations of the
operation of the box that were initiated by the experimenter. Following
this, participants were asked ‘‘Which picture do you think shows how the
box really works?’’ If no picture was selected they were prompted with
the question ‘‘Can you give me the picture which shows how the box
really works?’’ After participants made their choice the other two pictures
were removed, leaving their choice of causal structure diagram in full
view in front of the box. Participants were then asked the same two
intervention questions about a hypothetical scenario as in the previous
experiments.
Results and discussion
Causal questions. Table 5 shows the percentage of both children and
adults who gave each type of response to the causal questions. The pattern
of response in both age groups is very similar to that found in the previous
experiments, with a majority of those in the sequential condition giving
responses that were categorised as causal chain responses, while those
categorised as common cause responses were the most popular response in
the synchronous condition. Again, relatively few participants made coupled
or time-inconsistent responses, and these responses were not included in
the subsequent chi-squared analyses of the responses to causal questions.
The frequency of common cause and causal chain responses diﬀered
between the two conditions for the children’s group, w2(1, N¼ 53)¼ 12.43,
p5 .001. Likewise the frequency of common cause to causal chain responses
also diﬀered among the adult group in the manner predicted by the temporal
hypothesis, w2(1, N¼ 51)¼ 12.48, p¼ .001. As in Experiment 1, we examined
the numbers of participants who produced responses predicted by a
temporal cue hypothesis compared to the numbers who produced other
TIME AND CAUSATION 185
types of responses, summed across conditions. There was no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the 6–7-year-old group and the adult groups in the
number of participants who produced the predicted response pattern,
w2(1, N¼ 112)¼ 0.85, p4 .05, a ﬁnding that is consistent with that of
Experiment 1.
Causal model choice. Table 5 also shows the percentage of participants
who selected each type of causal model in the two conditions. Note that no
participants made time-inconsistent model choices in the sequential
condition. There was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distribution of common
cause versus causal chain model choices between the two conditions for the
6–7-year-olds, w2(1, N¼ 60)¼ 13.30, p5 .001, and also for the adults, w2(1,
N¼ 52)¼ 13.02, p¼ .001. The pattern of responses for both age groups was
similar to that seen in response to the causal questions. However, among the
children, the diﬀerence between the two conditions was somewhat more
marked for the causal model choice. This is because more children chose the
common cause model in the synchronous condition than gave answers to the
causal questions that were categorised in this way. The numbers of
participants who chose a model consistent with a temporal cue hypothesis
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two groups, w2(1, N¼ 112)¼ .04,
p4 .05.
Intervention questions. Children and adult’s responses to the interven-
tion questions are also given in Table 5. In this experiment the majority of
children in both conditions gave responses that were categorised as common
TABLE 5
Percentage of children and adults giving each response type as a function of condition
in Experiment 3
6–7-year-olds Adults
Synchronous Sequential Synchronous Sequential
Causal questions Common cause 47% 11% 77% 31%
Causal chain 37% 75% 19% 69%
Coupled 16% – 4% –
Time-inconsistent – 14% – 0%
Causal model choice Common cause 67% 29% 73% 23%
Causal chain 33% 71% 27% 77%
Intervention questions Common cause 67% 64% 50% 23%
Causal chain 13% 22% 23% 77%
Coupled 20% – 27% –
Time-inconsistent – 14% – 0%
– indicates that the response type does not apply in that condition.
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cause responses to the intervention questions. As in Experiments 1 and 2
there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distribution of common cause and
causal chain responses between the two conditions, w2(1, N¼ 50)¼ 1.36,
p4 .05. However, the distribution of common cause to causal chain
responses among the adult group was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the two
conditions, w2(1, N¼ 45)¼ 9.25, p¼ .001. We also examined the numbers of
participants who produced responses to the intervention questions that were
consistent with a temporal cue hypothesis, collapsed across conditions.
Although a higher percentage of adults produced the predicted pattern of
responses (63% adults compared to 47% of children), the diﬀerence between
the age groups just failed to reach signiﬁcance, w2(1, N¼ 112)¼ 3.17,
p¼ .075.
Response consistency. Further analyses examined the consistency of
both children’s and adult’s responses to causal questions, causal model
selections, and intervention questions. A minority of children (40%) were
consistent in their responses to causal questions and intervention questions,
and only 47% produced responses to the intervention questions that were
consistent with their causal model selection. Thus, as in previous
experiments, intervention judgements were not reliably consistent with
causal judgements. There was moderate consistency between causal model
choices and answers to causal questions, with 67% of children choosing a
causal model that matched their answers to causal questions. Note that
consistency here may have been reduced by the fact that children had to
choose between only three possible models—there was no model that
matched the coupled response given by children to causal questions who had
judged that B makes C go and C makes B go, so by default these children
could not choose a consistent model. If children who gave such answers to
the causal questions are excluded, 75% of children are categorised as
choosing a causal model consistent with their answers to causal questions.
Adults, by contrast, revealed a high degree of consistency between their
causal question responses and causal model choice (85%), between both
their causal question responses and intervention question responses (80%),
and between their causal model choice and intervention question responses
(88%). Indeed 80% of the adult group was consistent across all three of the
question types.
The results are broadly similar to the results from the ﬁrst two
experiments, with the use of the modiﬁed apparatus not appearing to have
an eﬀect on the overall pattern of response to the causal questions. The
diﬀerent patterns of causal model choice evidenced across the two
conditions for both children and adults provide further support to the
hypothesis that temporal order information guides causal structure
judgements. The high rate of consistency between adults’ responses to the
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causal questions and their choice of causal model suggests that the
causal models were interpreted as representing the causal structure
of the apparatus as indexed initially by their response to the causal
questions.
Overall there was no diﬀerence in the distribution of responses to the
intervention questions between the two conditions for the children, and as a
group they again failed to be consistent in their responses to causal
questions and those to intervention question. This was despite the fact that
children had the extra visual aid in the form of a causal diagram of their
causal structure choice placed before them. Children’s causal model choices
were usually (although not always) consistent with the answers they had
given to the causal questions, suggesting that most of them had indeed
extracted a causal structure of the relationship between all three events.
However, despite possessing such a representation, children’s patterns of
answers to intervention questions was quite diﬀerent from that seen in their
answers to causal questions, indicating that whatever the nature of this
representation it did not appropriately support intervention judgements.
This ﬁnding is at variance with adults’ responses to the intervention
questions, which were usually consistent with their causal structure
inferences. This ﬁnding also runs contrary to those of Schulz et al.
(2007a). However, we note that although Schulz et al.’s (2007a) ﬁndings
provide some support for the claim that even younger children (4-year-olds)
can use their representations of causal structure to make accurate
predictions about interventions, the data from their experiment are
somewhat limited. Inspection of the data (Schulz et al., 2007a, Exp. 2)
indicates that although children made the appropriate predictions regarding
the eﬀects of intervention more often than would be expected by chance, in
no case did the majority of their (relatively small) sample of children give the
correct response (i.e., no more that 8/16 children gave the correct response
on any trial type).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The ﬁndings of this study strongly support Lagnado and Sloman’s (2004,
2006) claim that temporal information is used as a cue to causal structure. In
our task participants were given minimal information on which to base
judgements of causal structure: They were not shown information about the
consequences of interventions or covariation information that could be used
to determine causal structure. Under such circumstances, 6–7-year-olds and
adults recruited the temporal properties of the event sequence in making
causal judgements. When two events B and C occurred simultaneously after
an initiating event A, these age groups gave a pattern of responses that
suggested they represented the causal structure of events as a common cause
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structure. However, when event A was followed by B and after a short delay
event C followed event B, these age groups gave a pattern of responses that
suggested they represented the causal structure of events as a causal chain.
The pattern of performance was consistent across all three experiments,
suggesting that the eﬀects of temporal cues on causal structure learning are
robust.
These ﬁndings add to the growing body of research on adults’ and
children’s causal structure learning. Other researchers have argued that both
children and adults may be able to recruit conditional probability
information and information derived from observing or performing
interventions on a causal system in making causal structure judgements
(e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004; Steyvers et al., 2003). Our ﬁndings complement
this research by showing that, in the absence of such information,
participants can use simple temporal cues to guide their causal structure
judgements. We note that in previous studies examining causal structure
learning, levels of accuracy in adult participants have sometimes been as low
as around 20–30%, even when simple three-variable systems have been used
(Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Steyvers et al., 2003; note that a key diﬀerence
between the events in these studies and those used in our studies is that
causal relationships were probabilistic). Although it makes less sense to talk
about levels of accuracy in our task, it is notable that the proportions of 6–7-
year-olds and adults who performed according to predictions were relatively
high (e.g., in Experiment 3 around 70% of participants in both age groups
chose the predicted causal model diagram). In other words, although
participants in other studies may sometimes have found it diﬃcult to recruit
covariation or conditional probability information, the majority of our
participants readily made use of the temporal cues provided to them. Put
together with other ﬁndings in the literature, an obvious conclusion is that a
number of diﬀerent cues can be recruited in causal structure learning. The
implication of this is that models of the processes underpinning such
learning need to account for how such cues are used and moreover how they
are combined or weighted (see Lagnado et al., 2007, for a detailed discussion
of this point).
Performance of 4-year-olds
Although the causal judgements of 6–7-year-olds and adults were informed
by temporal information in the predicted manner, this was not the case for
youngest group in the study, 4-year-olds (Experiment 1). There is general
agreement that the causal judgements of children of this age are strongly
aﬀected by temporal contiguity (e.g., Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Schlott-
mann, 1999), and studies with much younger children, using displays similar
to those used in studies of adult perceptual causation, suggest that their
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perception of events is, like that of adults, strongly aﬀected by the temporal
dynamics of the events (Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes
& Cohen, 1990). It may be that patterns of performance found in older
children and adults reﬂect the employment of the sort of temporal heuristic
that Lagnado and Sloman (2004, 2006) describe, and that such a heuristic is
reliably adopted only with development, perhaps as a result of experience
with a variety of causal systems. Or it may be that such heuristics are intact
early in development, but that their eﬀective use requires actually
remembering the temporal properties of the events that have been observed,
and that 4-year-olds have diﬃculty with remembering these features of the
event sequence. It is possible that, with additional pre-training on the
possible causal structures that may obtain between the test events, 4-year-
olds would be more likely to consider temporal information in making their
causal structure judgements. In Experiment 1 the experimenter did not
explicitly cue children to consider speciﬁc possible structures (e.g., common
cause or causal chain), but rather children were simply shown the events and
asked to make judgements. It may be that younger children would make use
of the temporal information in the context of a more structured and
supportive task. In any case, our ﬁndings suggest that although temporal
information may provide a basic and important cue to causation, it may not
always play this role in the same way in young children as it does in older
children.
This ﬁnding is potentially consistent with some other recent research that
has shown that 4-year-olds have diﬃculty taking temporal information into
account when making inferences (McColgan & McCormack, 2008;
McCormack & Hoerl, 2005, 2007). Nevertheless, it is important to
remember that it was not the case that 4-year-olds’ causal judgements were
logically inconsistent with the temporal properties of the events that they
had observed. The temporal information that participants were provided
with gave one cue to causal structure, but the events were in fact always
consistent with a number of diﬀerent causal structures. For example, in the
sequential condition although there was a delay between the occurrence of
event B and the occurrence of event C, it is perfectly possible that A was a
common cause of B and C and that B played no causal role in the
occurrence of C. The temporal properties of the event sequence in this
condition only rule out any structure in which C is a cause of B. Indeed, only
2 out of 23 of the 4-year-olds made causal judgements that were categorised
as indicating such a time-inconsistent representation of causal structure.
This ﬁnding indicates that although 4-year-olds do not seem to use temporal
information as a cue to structure in the same way as older children,
nevertheless at the very least their judgements respect the temporal priority
principle (i.e., that causes do not precede their eﬀects), in line with Bullock
and Gelman’s (1979) original ﬁndings.
190 BURNS AND MCCORMACK
Judgements about interventions
In Experiments 1 and 3, adults’ judgements about the eﬀects of simple
interventions on the system diﬀered across the temporal conditions as
predicted, and moreover their intervention judgements tended to be
consistent with their causal judgements (consistency was around 80% in
Experiment 3). However, 6–7-year-olds’ judgements regarding interventions
were not aﬀected by temporal information in a similar manner to their
causal judgements, and were not reliably consistent with their causal
judgements even when a pictorial representation was present as a reminder
of their causal structure judgement (Experiment 3). This might seem, at least
at ﬁrst sight, to be broadly inconsistent with recent suggestions that the
types of representations that are used to make causal judgements can also be
used to make judgements about the hypothetical or counterfactual eﬀects of
interventions on the system. (Hagmayer et al., 2007; Schulz et al., 2007b).
Causal models theory accounts for such prediction making by assuming that
the intervention ﬁxes the value of the intervened-upon variable and then
the remaining links in the model can be used to infer the consequences of the
intervention (for greater detail, see Hagmayer et al., 2007). Certainly, the
judgements of adults in our studies would suggest that they ﬁnd such
inferences relatively straightforward for the simple systems used in our
studies (and see Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005, for demonstrations that
adults can reason about the consequences of interventions on more complex
systems).
The issue of the relationship between causal judgements and judgements
about the eﬀects of interventions has become particularly important not
only in the light of causal models theory, but also given a recent approach to
causal cognition known as interventionism (Woodward, 2007, in press; see
also various discussions in Gopnik & Schulz, 2007). This approach, which
has its origins in a highly inﬂuential philosophical account of the nature of
causation itself (Woodward, 2003), has only recently been considered as a
psychological account of the nature of causal cognition. For present
purposes we will deﬁne interventionism loosely as an approach that
characterises causal knowledge as being, at its core, knowledge about the
eﬀects of observed, hypothetical, or counterfactual interventions. It can be
contrasted with more traditional psychological accounts that characterise
causal knowledge in terms of knowledge about mechanism (e.g., Shultz,
1982; White, 1995). Woodward contrasts these two types of approaches
using the distinction between diﬀerence-making and causal process accounts
of causation. Diﬀerence-making accounts, of which interventionism is a
recent inﬂuential example, focus on the idea that causes make a diﬀerence to
their eﬀects, whereas causal process accounts focus on the processes by
which causes result in their eﬀects.
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Traditionally, developmental psychologists have tended to appeal to
causal process accounts in characterising the acquisition of causal knowl-
edge. For example, Shultz (1982) described causal learning as involving a
grasp of the principles of generative transmission, with causal learning in
essence involving learning about the mechanisms by which such transmis-
sion occurs. Schulz et al. (2007b) argue that while it may be true that
children may possess knowledge about the operation of speciﬁc mechanisms
that they have encountered, such mechanism knowledge is not basic to
representations of causal relationships. They point out that frequently even
adults have little or no understanding of many of the mechanisms
underpinning causal relationships in systems with which they are very
familiar. Instead, what is argued to be basic to their causal knowledge is a
sensitivity to the eﬀects of intervening on or acting upon variables in such
causal systems. As Schulz et al. (2007b) put it ‘‘A causal relation then is
deﬁned not in terms of its physical instantiation but in terms of the real and
counterfactual interventions it supports’’ (p. 69). Thus it can be seen that, on
this account, part of what it is to represent B as the cause of C in our task is
a sensitivity to the fact that, all other things being equal, if B cannot occur
(as is the case when it is intervened upon in the task), C will not happen.
Given the interventionist account it is striking, then, that our 6–7-year-old
group did not reliably make judgements about the eﬀects of such
interventions in line with their causal judgements and that their intervention
judgements, unlike their causal judgements, were not aﬀected by temporal
information.
Do our results challenge the interventionist account? In making their
judgements about the eﬀects of interventions, children had to imagine a
hypothetical scenario that they had not yet encountered (A operating while
B or C were disabled), and the intervention in question was one that was
carried out by the experimenter rather than the child him- or herself. In
contrast to our ﬁndings, other recent research has suggested that even
younger children can craft appropriate interventions if asked to act
themselves to either prevent an event occurring or make it occur (see
Schulz et al., 2007b, for review). It may be that it is making explicit verbal
judgements about the hypothetical eﬀects of another’s interventions that
children have diﬃculty with. Indeed, in his recent discussion of the
relationship between children’s causal judgements and judgements about the
eﬀects of hypothetical and counterfactual interventions, Woodward
(in press) has argued that it may be possible to be ‘‘ ‘implicitly’ guided by
or sensitive to action-oriented counterfactuals even if one is not able to
provide correct verbal answers to explicit questions about them’’. Another
possibility is that the type of explicit judgement about interventions that
children were asked to make was particularly diﬃcult, and intrinsically more
diﬃcult than causal judgements. Whereas causal questions simply required
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children to judge which component made another operate, the intervention
questions were conditional in form (i.e., required ‘‘if . . . then . . .’’ judge-
ments), and moreover were conditioned on two events: the disabling of B or
C and the operating of A.
These considerations suggest that it might be possible to simplify the
sorts of intervention judgements that children are required to make, either
by asking children to make action-based responses or by asking intervention
questions that condition only on a single event (e.g., by asking whether C
would operate if B were manipulated). We have begun exploring these
possibilities in our empirical work, with ﬁndings so far suggesting that even
using such response modes, children ﬁnd intervention judgements diﬃcult in
this task. Clearly, additional research is necessary on the relationship
between causal judgements and judgements about the eﬀects of interven-
tions. Moreover, if interventionism is to replace the mechanism-based
accounts that have been prevalent within the developmental literature, it is
important to consider the extent to which such an account predicts a reliable
consistency between such judgements.
We ﬁnish by considering a diﬀerent perspective on why children’s causal
judgements may have diﬀered from their intervention judgements, which
requires a consideration of the types of processes that are involved in the
recruitment of temporal information in our task. One interesting possibility
is that the cross-condition diﬀerences observed in causal judgements reﬂect
the operation of processes more akin to those usually examined in studies of
so-called perceptual causation, rather than reﬂecting the operation of an
inferential reasoning process. Studies of perceptual causation have demon-
strated that small diﬀerences in the spatio-temporal dynamics of an event
sequence can aﬀect whether or not two events are perceived as causally
related (e.g., Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann, 2000; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).
In our task the delays between events and the diﬀerence between temporal
conditions were in the order of 0.5–1 second (following Lagnado & Sloman,
2004, 2006). Although these delays, and the event displays themselves, are
quite diﬀerent from those used in studies of perceptual causation, it may
nevertheless be the case that participants tend to ‘‘perceive’’ that one event
causes another, rather than making such judgements through reﬂecting
upon the properties of the event sequences they have been shown (see, e.g.,
Schlottmann, 1999). In contrast, the intervention judgements undoubtedly
require reﬂective reasoning. Judgements based on perceived causality are
known to be aﬀected by quite diﬀerent types of task parameters than those
based on more inferential processes (Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992), and it
has recently been argued that they involve quite diﬀerent brain structures
(Roser, Fugelsang, Dunbar, Corballis, & Gazzaniga, 2005). It is possible
that causal judgements that arise from more perceptually based processes
might not easily support intervention judgements, and it may be the case
TIME AND CAUSATION 193
that it is only with development that they do. Indeed, Schlottmann’s (1999)
own research suggests that the relationship between judgements based on
perceptual causation and more inferentially based judgements changes
developmentally. We recognise that the distinction between causal judge-
ments based on perception and those based on inference is not necessarily a
clear-cut one (Schlottmann, 2000). Nevertheless, the issue of whether or not
the eﬀects of timing on causal judgements that we (and Lagnado & Sloman,
2006) have observed should be considered alongside ﬁndings from the
perceptual causation literature is an intriguing issue and one that requires
further investigation.
In conclusion, we have found strong evidence that both adults and 6–7-
year-olds use temporal information to inform their judgements of causal
structure in a situation in which there were minimal cues to causation. Our
results and those of Lagnado and Sloman (2004, 2006) provide good reason to
believe that temporal information in and of itself may provide an important
cue to causal structure. However, 4-year-olds did not appear to use temporal
cues in the same way as older children and adults. Adults’ judgements of the
eﬀects of an intervention were similarly aﬀected by the temporal properties of
the event sequence that they had viewed, but this was not the case for children.
This latter result is particularly striking in the light of recent interventionist
accounts of causal cognition, since it suggests that children’s representations of
causal structure may not always support accurate judgements about the
hypothetical eﬀects of interventions. It may be the case that whether or not a
tight relationship is found between children’s causal and intervention
judgements will depend on the information on which causal judgements are
based, or the nature of the intervention judgements.
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